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ABSTRACT " ^Y CA 93943-1^^
The MV-22 "Osprey" was designed as a "medium-lift" replacement for the
Marine Corps CH-46E "Sea Knight" and CH-53D "Sea Stallion" helicopters. The
MV-22 's tilt-rotor technology will allow it to exploit the operational envelopes of
both helicopters and turbo-prop aircraft. This expanded performance envelope,
along with the capability to conduct aerial refueling, will allow a MV-22 lifted
force to influence future operations through an increase in range and speed.
This thesis quantifies the impact that fielding the MV-22 within the 2nd
Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) will have on its KC-130 squadrons. This impact
arises from the MV-22 's capability to receive fuel in-flight (aerial refuel). Since
the CH-46E and CH-53D could not aerial refuel, their pilots did not have a need to
conduct aerial refueling training, and thus they had no demand for "tanker"
support from the KC-130 squadrons. Now that the MV-22 pilots will be required
to train for aerial refueling operations, KC-130 squadrons will be required to
provide "tanker" support for them.
This research quantifies the future increase in demand in terms of aerial
refueling missions and offers recommendations to reduce it. For 2nd MAW, this
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This research develops a model to predict the number of MV-22 aerial
refueling training missions within the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) from
FYOO to FY14. These numbers are important for two reasons: (1) to present U.S.
Marine Planners additional information that may be useful in determining future
procurement requirements for the KC-130J; (2) to provide essential information to
help the active duty Marine Air Wings (MAWs) determine the impact the MV-22
will have on KC-130 Squadrons.
B. BACKGROUND
As the Marine Corps enters into the 21 st century, improving technology and
the ever-changing geopolitical structure calls for revolutionary changes to our
traditional amphibious doctrine. This call has been answered by the Marine
Corps' strategic vision statement, "Operational Maneuver From The Sea"
(OMFTS). Essential to OMFTS is the ability to move units from ships lying over
the horizon to objectives far from the shore. One of the Marine Corps solutions to
this problem is the MV-22 "Osprey," the first tilt-rotor aircraft to be fielded
anywhere in the world.
The MV-22 was designed as the "medium-lift" replacement for the Marine
Corps aging CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters. Presently there are 231 CH-46Es
and 45 CH-53Ds in service with the Marine Corps. [Ref. 1] In FYOO, the Marine
Corps will begin "fielding" the MV-22. [Ref. 2] This process will conclude in
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FY14, with a total strength of approximately 360 MV-22s (337 factoring in an
annual "peacetime" attrition rate of 1%). [Ref. 3]
Besides the increase in speed and range that the MV-22 offers, there is one
capability that the U.S. Marine Corps CH-46Es and CH-53Ds do not possess.
This is the capability to conduct aerial refueling. Aerial refueling is the process
where one aircraft refuels another aircraft while in flight. There are several
"tanker" platforms within the armed services capable of conducting this mission
(i.e. KC-10, KC-135); one belongs to the Marine Corps. This aircraft is known as
the KC-130 "Hercules." Because of the limited Marine Corps "tanker" fleet, the
introduction of a new group of aerial refueling (receive only) capable aircraft
could present a problem.
The problem is best described through the traditional economic model of
"Supply vs. Demand." This scenario will likely be one where the "Supply"
(Marine Corps aircraft capable of "giving" fuel in flight) is held constant and the
"Demand" (Marine Corps aircraft capable of receiving fuel in flight) increases as a
result of fielding the MV-22s. . This scenario implies that the Marine Corps will
encounter an impending shortage based on the fixed number of "Tanker" aircraft.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary
The primary research question that this thesis will address is: How many
aerial refueling training missions should the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW)
plan to conduct to support MV-22 pilot proficiency requirements?
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2. Subsidiary
The subsidiary research questions are:
• Will there be a difference between the amount of aerial refueling
training missions required to support a "Core" MV-22 Squadron and
a "Reinforced" MV-22 Squadron?
• How can the Marine Corps reduce the impact of the increased aerial
refueling training requirements on the KC-130 community?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This research will analyze historical data from several 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing, Marine Medium Helicopter (HMM) and Marine Heavy Helicopter (HMH)
squadrons. The data measures the quantity of aerial refueling training missions
scheduled and flown to support the CH-53E pilot training requirements. Data
from the HMM squadrons will be derived from the period they were reinforced
(HMM (REIN)). This data will be used to develop a model to forecast the MV-22
aerial refueling training requirements as it is fielded from FYOO to FY14.
The scope of this study will include:
• Predicting the aerial refueling missions required by MV-22
Squadrons to maintain the proficiency of their pilots for the time
period between Fiscal Years 2000 and 2014.
Recommending alternative fuel delivery aircraft (tankers) to support
the MV-22 aerial refueling training requirements.
Reviewing the aerial refueling training requirements for the AV-8B,
EA-6B, F/A-18A/B/C &D, CH-53E and the MV-22.
The scope will not include:
• Predicting the fuel required to fulfill MV-22 aerial refueling training
requirements.
• Predicting the costs to support MV-22 Aerial refueling
Requirements.
• Predicting the percentage increase in yearly KC-130 flight hours.
• Developing doctrine for using MV-22 and/or KC-130 aircraft.
2. Limitations
This thesis estimates the amount of aerial refueling training missions
required to support MV-22 squadrons, specifically within the 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing (MAW). The findings for 2d MAW may or may not be applicable to the
other two active-duty MAWs. Differences in the number of organizational
elements and deployment cycles may cause these results to vary. Therefore,
without further research, the author can not conclude that the results from this
model are applicable to the other MAWs.
The "HMM (Rein)" data for the model was based on data acquired from
three of the six HMM squadrons within 2d MAW. This limitation reflects limited
time for "on-site" research and the squadrons' operational commitments.
Additionally, most squadrons only maintain past flight schedules and NAVFLIRs
for the previous two years. Therefore, only one year's worth of composite HMM
data could be collected from the squadrons currently not deployed.
3. Assumptions
Based on this research and the author's previous experience as a Marine
aviator with over 2800 flight hours, the following assumptions were applied to the
forecast model:
• Aerial refueling training missions are a factor of pilot proficiency
requirements.
• The MV-22 pilot's aerial refueling training proficiency requirements
are the same as a CH-53E pilot's requirements.
• The "Table of Organization (T/O)" for the number of pilots in a
MV-22 squadron will be the same as a CH-46E squadron.
• The MV-22 Squadrons training and deployment cycle will mirror
that of a CH-46E Squadron.
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis research includes the following: (1) a
literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library
information resources, (2) a site visit to MCAS New River to research past
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) and Marine Heavy Helicopter
Squadron (HMH) operational, maintenance and administrative records, (3)
interviews with personnel from APW, MOTT, MAWTS-1, MAG-26 and MAG-
29, (4) Developing a model for the aerial refueling training requirements of a
standard MV-22 Squadron (VMM) and a Reinforced MV-22 Squadron
(VMM(REIN)) based on data collected in Step 2, (5) analyzing the results.
F. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH
Chapter I. Introduction. This chapter describes the purpose of the thesis
and states the primary and subsidiary research question.
Chapter II. Marine Aviation. This chapter summarizes the background
information necessary to understand Marine Aviation's missions and
organizational structure.
Chapter III. The Future and Marine Aviation. This chapter reviews the
Marine Corps strategic vision "Operational Maneuver Warfare From The Sea
(OMFTS)" and the role of the MV-22 "Osprey."
Chapter IV. Forecasting Aerial Refueling Training Missions for the MV-
22. This chapter describes how the model used to estimate the future MV-22
aerial refueling training missions was developed and presents its forecasted
results.
Chapter V. Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter will provide
the conclusions and recommendations to the author's primary and subsidiary
research questions, as well as suggest areas for further study.
II. MARINE AVIATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the reader with the background information necessary
to understand the importance of Marine Aviation in supporting the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It focuses on explaining the roles and missions of
the different units that comprise a Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW).
B. MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE
The uniqueness of the United States Marine Corps is epitomized through
the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Expeditionary in nature, the
MAGTF can rapidly deploy by either sea or air and provide the naval or joint
commander a force capable of operating as [Ref. 4]:
• The landing force of an amphibious task organization.
• A land force in sustained operations ashore.
• The landward portion of a naval force conducting military operations
other than war.
When compared to the other Armed Forces of the United States, neither the
Navy, Army nor Air Force possesses the MAGTF 's capability to provide a
completely indigenous "combined arms" force. "Combined arms" can be defined
as, "The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate
firepower and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy." [Ref. 5]
The MAGTF's unique combined arms capability is facilitated by its
organizational structure. Regardless of it size, each MAGTF will train and deploy
with the same organizational structure. Due to this continuity in structure, a
MAGTF may increase or decrease in size with little to no reorganization. This
flexibility is an essential characteristic for a successful military organization.
1. Structure
The following four elements are common to all MAGTFs.
a. Command Element
The Command Element (CE) is the Headquarters element of each
MAGTF. It is task organized to provide the command and control capabilities that
are necessary for effective planning, execution and assessment of operations
across the six warfighting functions 1 . [Ref. 6]
b. Ground Combat Element
The Ground Combat Element (GCE) is task organized to conduct
ground operations, project combat power, and contribute to battlespace dominance
in supporting the MAGTF's mission. It is formed around an infantry organization
that is reinforced as necessary with artillery, reconnaissance, assault amphibian,
armor and engineer forces. The GCE is one of two elements of the MAGTF
specifically designed for combat operations. [Ref. 7]
The six-warfighting functions are: command and control, intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics, and
force protection.
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c. Aviation Combat Element
The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is task organized to conduct
air operations, project combat power, and contribute to battlespace dominance in
support of the MAGTF's mission by performing some or all of the six functions of
Marine Aviation. It is formed around an aviation headquarters with air control
agencies and combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The
ACE may be employed from ships or forward expeditionary land bases and can
readily transition between sea bases and land bases without losing capability. The
ACE is one of two MAGTF elements specifically designed for combat operations.
[Ref. 8]
d. Combat Service Support Element
The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) is task organized to
provide the full range of tactical logistic functions necessary to support the
MAGTF's continued readiness and sustainability. [Ref. 9]
2. Types ofMAGTFs
There are three types ofMAGTFs currently utilized by the Marine Corps.
a. Marine Expeditionary Force
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the principle warfighting
organization for the Marine Corps and the largest of the three MAGTFs. Each
MEF has approximately 46,100 Marines and Sailors within its four elements. The
organizational structure for a typical MEF is depicted in Figure 2.1.
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MEFs remain at their home base until called into service. At that
time, they will typically deploy by echelon utilizing nearby Naval or Air Force
bases. The MEF has the ability to sustain itself for approximately 60 days. After
60 days resupply will be through other U.S. Services or host nations. [Ref. 10]
There are currently three active duty MEFs within the United States
Marine Corps.
• I MEF is based in southern California and Arizona and is assigned to
the Commander in Chief United States Pacific Command
(CINCUSUSPACOM).
• II MEF is based in North and South Carolina and is assigned to the
Commander in Chief United States Atlantic Command
(CINCUSACOM).
• III MEF is based in Hawaii, Okinawa, and Japan and is assigned to
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Figure 2.1. MEF Organizational Structure [Ref. 11]
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b. Marine Expeditionary Unit
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest MAGTF and
is routinely forward deployed as part of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).
Once deployed, the MEU can sustain itself ashore for a period of 15 days. Each
MEU has approximately 2,200 Marines and Sailors within its four elements. [Ref.
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Figure 2.2. MEU Organizational Structure
There are currently seven active duty MEUs within the Marine
Corps. Prior to deploying, each MEU will go through an extensive work-up and
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evaluation period so they can deploy as a designated Marine Expeditionary Unit,
Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC).
• The 22nd
,
24th and 26th MEUs are based out of Camp Lejeune North
Carolina and regularly deploy to regions bordering the
Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.




and 15 th MEUs are based out of Camp Pendelton
California and regularly deploy to regions bordering the Pacific and
Indian Oceans as well as the Arabian Gulf.
• The 31 st MEU is based out of Camp Smedley Butler, Okinawa,
Japan and regularly deploys to regions bordering the Pacific and
Indian Oceans.
c. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force
These MAGTFs are usually temporary in nature and formed to
conduct a mission for which a MEF or a MEU is either inappropriate or
unavailable. Special Purpose MAGTFs may be any size but they are usually no
bigger then a MEU. Regardless of size they still will include a CE, GCE, ACE
and CSSE. [Ref. 14]
C. MARINE AVIATION'S ROLE
The primary mission of Marine Corps aviation is to participate as the
air component of the MAGTF in the seizure and defense of
advanced naval bases and to conduct such land operations as may be
essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign. A collateral
mission is to participate as an integral component of naval aviation
in the execution of such other Navy functions as the fleet
commanders may direct. In practice, Marine aviation assets also
participate in joint operations, sometimes as part of a MAGTF or
naval expeditionary force and sometimes without other Marine
Corps or Navy elements.
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To accomplish its mission, Marine Corps aviation is organized,
trained and equipped to provide the task-organized ACE for any size
MAGTF. The ACE must be prepared to operate from both sea- and
shore-based facilities in support of MAGTF expeditionary
operations as well as in sustained operations ashore... [Re f. 15:p. 2-
1]
1. Six Functions of Marine Aviation
When MAGTF or JTF commanders begin planning for the role that Marine
Aviation will fulfill in their operation, their initial focus in on the functions the
ACE can provide. [Ref. 16:p. 2-1] Marine Corps aviation assets perform the
following six functions:
a. Offensive A ir Support
Offensive Air Support (OAS) involves operations utilizing aerial
delivered munitions against an opposing force's personnel, installations or
infrastructure. OAS missions are classified into either oftwo categories.
• Close Air Support (CAS) - involves missions that are conducted
against enemy targets within close proximity to friendly forces and
thus require detailed integration.
• Deep Air Support (DAS) - involves missions that are conducted
against enemy targets the are not in the immediate vicinity of
friendly forces.
b. Antiair Warfare
Antiair Warfare (AAW) involves offensive and defensive measures
utilized in an effort to reduce an enemy's air and missile threat to an acceptable
level. [Ref. 17:p2-3] AAW missions are classified into either oftwo categories:
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• Offensive Antiair Warfare (OAAW) - involves those operations
conducted against enemy air assets and air defense systems before
they can be launched. [Ref. 18:p. 2-3]
• Air Defense - involves defensive measures designed to destroy
attacking enemy aircraft and missiles. [Ref. 19:p. 2-4]
c. Assault Support
Assault Support involves using aircraft to provide tactical mobility
and logistical support for the MAGTF, moving high-priority cargo and personnel
within the immediate area of operations, in-flight refueling and the evacuation/
recovery of personnel and equipment. [Ref. 20:p. 2-4] Assault support missions




Combat Assault Support - involves rapidly deploying personnel and
equipment to support offensive maneuver warfare, bypass obstacles
or meet the enemy threat. [Ref. 21 :p. 2-5]
Aerial Delivery - involves transporting equipment or supplies to
forward operating bases or remote areas in which landing sites or
fields are not available. [Ref. 22:p. 2-5]
Aerial Refueling (AR) - involves refueling airborne fixed-wing or
rotary-wing aircraft by another aircraft. [Ref. 23 :p. 2-5]
Aerial Evacuation - involves transporting personnel and equipment
from forward operating bases (FOB) or other remote areas to secure
rear areas. [Ref. 24 :p. 2-5]
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) - involves
recovering downed personnel and/or equipment during a tactical
situation that precludes normal Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.
[Ref. 25:p. 2-5]
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•Aerial Logistical Support Operations - involves using fixed-wing
aircraft to deliver personnel, equipment and supplies beyond the
range of helicopter or surface transportation (i.e., vehicle, ship).
[Ref. 26:p. 2-5]
Battlespace Illumination - involves the illumination of an area by
either fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft with artificial devices such
as flares or lights. [Ref. 27 :p. 2-5]
d. Air Reconnaissance
Air reconnaissance involves acquiring intelligence information by
employing visual observation and/or in aerial vehicles. [Ref. 28:p 2-5] There are
three types of aerial reconnaissance:
• Visual Reconnaissance - involves information gathered through
observation by a pilot or aircrew member. [Ref. 29:p. 2-5]
• Multisensor Imagery Reconnaissance - involves obtaining imagery
from standard photographic or advanced radar and infrared cameras.
[Ref. 30:p. 2-5]
• Electronic Reconnaissance - involves gathering information on
enemy electromagnetic radiation by passive receivers. [Ref. 3 1 :p. 2-
6]
e. Electronic Warfare
Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as any military action using
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or
attack. [Ref. 32] Electronic warfare can be classified as one of three types:
• Electronic Attack (EA) - involves using electromagnetic or directed
energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment. [Ref. 33 :p. 2-6]
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Electronic Protection (EP) - involves action taken to protect friendly
personnel, facilities and equipment from any effect of friendly or
enemv EW emplovment. TRef. 34:d. 2-61y y [ p ]
• Electronic Warfare Support (ES) - involves searching, intercepting,
identifying and locating sources of intentionally or unintentionally
radiated electromagnetic energy to recognize an immediate threat.
[Ref. 35:p. 2-6]
/ Control ofAircraft and Missiles
Control of aircraft and missiles is the function that gives a
commander the means to exercise their command and control over the other five
functions of Marine aviation. [Ref. 36 :p. 2-6] This function is further divided into
two categories.
• Air Direction - is the authority to regulate air resources, including
both aircraft and surface-to-air weapons, to maintain a balance
between their availability and the priorities assigned to their use.
[Ref. 37:p. 2-7]
• Air Control - is the authority to direct the aircraft's physical
maneuver in flight or to direct an aircraft or surface-to-air weapons
unit to engage a specific target. [Ref. 38:p. 2-7]
D. MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
The Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) is the ACE of a MEF and is the smallest
aviation unit that possesses the inherent capability to perform Marine Aviation's
six functions. [Ref. 39:p. 5-3] Administratively, there are three active duty
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Figure 2.3. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing Organizational Structure
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1. Organization
When the MAW is deployed as the ACE for a MAGTF, the MAW
headquarters becomes the CE for the ACE. [Ref. 40:p. 2-7] Along with the
headquarters element, the MAW's subordinate units are known as Groups. These
Groups are comprised of Squadrons and are task organized on the basis of
assigned missions. 2 [Ref. 4 1 :p. 2-7]
a. Marine Air Control Group
The Marine Air Control Group (MACG) is responsible for
coordinating all aspects of air command and control and air defense within the
MAW. [Ref. 42:p. 2-8] Subordinate units within the MACG are:
(1) Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron . The
Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron (MTACS) provides personnel and
equipment to operate the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC). [Ref. 43 :p. 2-
14]
(2) Marine Air Control Squadron . The Marine Air
Control Squadron (MACS) provides air surveillance and controls aircraft and
surface-to-air weapons for AAW; it also provides continuous all-weather radar and
nonradar ATC services and airspace management. [Ref. 44:p. 2-14]
2
There is one exception. The Marine Air Control Group possesses a Low-Altitude Air Defense Battalion.
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(3) Marine Wing Communications Squadron . The
Marine Wing Communications Squadron (MWCS) provides expeditionary
communications for the ACE. Although it does not perform any of Marine
aviation's six functions, it supports the control of aircraft and missiles. [Ref. 45 :p
2-14]
(4) Low-Altitude Air Defense Battalion . The Low-
Altitude Air Defense Battalion (LAAD) provides close-in, surface-to-air weapons
fire to defend MAGTF assets, forward combat areas, maneuver forces, vital areas,
installations, and/or units engaged in special/ independent operations. [Ref. 46 :p.
2-15]
b. Marine Wing Support Group
The Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) provides all essential
ground support requirements/equipment to aid designated fixed-wing or rotary-
wing components of the Marine aviation combat air station, when based thereon.
[Ref. 47:p. 5-38]
(1) Marine Wing Support Squadron . The Marine Wing
Support Squadron (MWSS) provides motor transport, engineering services and
organizational maintenance (to motor transport and engineering services) for
either fixed-wing or rotary-wing units. [Ref. 48:p. 5-39]
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c. Marine Aircraft Groups
The Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) is the organizational element of
the MAW that possesses Marine aviation's most familiar asset, the aircraft. There
are two types of MAGs, a fixed-wing and rotary-wing. Each MAG is task
organized for the assigned mission to fulfill Marine Aviation's six functions. [Ref.
49:p.2-15]
(1) Marine Aviation Logistic Squadron . The Marine
Aviation Logistic Squadron (MALS) is the only squadron that is common across
MAGs yet does not operate aircraft. They are responsible for providing
intermediate-level maintenance for. aircraft and equipment as well as aviation
supply support. [Ref. 50:p. 2-16] Though common in name they differ because
each MALS must provide the unique support required by either a fixed-wing or
rotary-wing MAG.
(2) Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron . The
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadrons' (VMGR) primary mission is to
provide an aerial refueling service to support MAGTF air operations and assault
air transport for personnel, equipment and supplies. They may also perform
secondary roles as a Rapid Ground Refueler (RGR) or as a Direct Air Support
Center Airborne (DASC(A)). [Ref. 51:p. 2-16] Each VMGR Squadron operates
the KC-130 aircraft built by the Lockheed Martin Corporation (See Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4. Marine KC-130 [Ref. 52]
(3) Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron .
The Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ) conducts airborne
EW to support MAGTF operations involving EW and air reconnaissance
functions. [Ref. 53 :p. 2-16] Each VMAQ Squadron operates the EA-6B
"Prowler" aircraft built by the Grumman Aircraft Corporation (See Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5. Marine EA-6B [Ref. 54]
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(4) Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron . The
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU) operates and maintains a
UAV system to provide the MAGTF unmanned aerial reconnaissance support.
[Ref. 5 5 :p 2-17] Each VMU Squadron operates the RQ-2 "Pioneer" UAV built by
the AAI Corporation (See Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6. Marine RQ-2 [Ref. 56]
(5) Marine Fighter Attack Squadron . The Marine
Fighter Attack Squadrons' (VMFA) primary mission is to intercept and destroy
enemy aircraft under all weather conditions, and attack and destroy surface targets.
[Ref. 57:p. 2-17] Each VMFA Squadron operates the single-seated F/A-18A or C
"Hornet" aircraft built by the Boeing Company (See Figure 2.7).
3 The Boeing Company now owns The McDonnell Douglas Corporation the original producer of this
aircraft.
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Figure 2.7. Marine F/A-18 (A/C) [Ref. 58]
(6) Marine Ail-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron . The
Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadrons' (VMFA(AW)) primary mission is
to attack and destroy surface targets, day or night, under adverse weather
conditions; conduct multisensor imagery reconnaissance; provide supporting arms
coordination and intercept; and destroy enemy aircraft under all weather
conditions. [Ref. 59:p. 2-17] Each VMFA(AW) Squadron operates the tandem
seated F/A-18D "Hornet" aircraft built by the Boeing Company (See Figure 2.8). 3
Figure 2.8. Marine F/A-18D [Ref. 60]
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(7) Marine Attack Squadron . The Marine Attack
Squadrons' (VMA) primary mission is to attack and destroy surface targets under
day and night visual meteorological conditions and provide assault support escort.
[Ref. 61:p. 2-18] Each VMA Squadron operates the AV-8B "Harrier" aircraft
built by the Boeing Company (See Figure 2-9).3
Figure 2.9. Marine AV-8B [Ref. 62]
(8) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron . The Marine
Heavy Helicopter Squadrons' (HMH) primary mission is transporting heavy
weapons, equipment and supplies during amphibious operations and subsequent
operations ashore. [Ref. 63 :p 2-18] HMH Squadrons operate either the CH-53D
"Sea Stallion" (See Figure 2.10) or the CH-53E "Super Stallion" helicopters built
by the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (See Figure 2.1 1).
4
4
Prior to the introduction of the CH-53E (16-ton payload) in 1981, the CH-53D (7-ton payload) was
classified as a heavy-lift asset. They are now classified as a medium-lift asset, although the squadrons
remain designated as HMHs.
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Figure 2.10. Marine CH-53D [Ref. 64]
Figure 2.11. Marine CH-53E [Ref. 65]
(9) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron . The Marine
Medium Helicopter Squadrons' (HMM) primary mission is to transport combat
troops in the initial assault waves and follow-on stages of amphibious operations
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and subsequent operations ashore. [Ref. 66:p. 2-18] HMM Squadrons operate the
CH-46E "Sea Knight" helicopter built by the Boeing Company (See Figure 2.12).
Figure 2.12. Marine CH-46E [Ref. 67]
(10) Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron . The
Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadrons' (HMLA) primary mission is to
provide utility helicopter support, attack helicopter fire support and fire support
coordination during amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore.
[Ref. 68 :p. 2-19] To fulfill this mission, the HMLAs operate two different types
of helicopters. The UH-1N "Twin-huey" (See Figure 2.13) and the AH-1W
"Super Cobra" (See Figure 2.14). Bell Helicopter Textron builds both helicopters.
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Figure 2.13. Marine UH-1N [Ref. 69]
Figure 2.14. Marine AH-1W [Ref. 70]
2. Organizational Units and the Six Functions of Marine Aviation
It is essential to realize that in addition to their primary missions, many of
the MAW's organizational units fulfill additional roles. Table 2.1 allows the
reader to associate a specific organizational unit with an applicable Marine
Aviation function.
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MAW X X X X X X
MACG Support Support Support Support Support X
MTACS TACC
MASS DASC DASC
MACS Air Control ATC ATC ATC
LAAD X
MWCS Communications
MAG (Fixed-Wing) X X X X X Support
MALS(Fixed-Wing) Support Support Support Support Support Support
VMGR X Visual DASC(A)
VMAQ X X
VMU Support X
VMFA X Escort X X
VMFA(AW) X Escort X X FAC(A)/TAC(A)
VMA X Escort X Visual
MAG (Rotary-Wing) X X X X Support
MALS(Rotary-Wing) Support Support Support Support Support Support
HMH (CH-53D) Self-defense X Visual Airborne Control
and Coordination
HMH (CH-53E) Self-defense X Visual Airborne Control
and Coordination
HMM Self-defense X Visual Airborne Control
and Coordination
HMLA Utility Self-defense X Support Visual Airborne
Control
and Coordination




X = performs function
DASC, ATC, TACC, DASC(A), FAC(A) and TAC(A) = agency or group that performs function
Air control, communications, visual, escort, self-defense, airborne control and coordination, and support =
roles that the unit plays within the function
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E. MARINE AVIATION TRAINING AND READINESS PROGRAM
Training and Readiness Program
Marine Aviation exists in a complex, "high-risk" environment. This
complexity reflects the many types of aircraft that operate within that
environment. To help reduce the risk, control systems make sure that Marine
Corps aircrew consistently receive the training necessary to successfully and
safely operate their aircraft. The control measure most relevant to this study is the
U.S. Marine Corps Aviation Training and Readiness Program.
The Training and Readiness Program standardizes training for all aviation
personnel, including aircraft controllers. [Ref. 72 :p. 1-3] The Training and
Readiness program is coordinated through a sponsoring unit assigned by the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), located in Quantico,
Virginia. [Ref. 73 :p. D-l; Appendix D] These sponsoring units are usually the
respective training unit. Changes to the program may be submitted to the
sponsoring unit and reviewed at the next Training and Readiness conference.
After the conference, changes are published as a Marine Corps Order.
The Training and Readiness order that specifically addresses Marine
Aviation is the Marine Corps Order P3500 series. There are presently eight
Volumes in this series of orders, covering all operational and support aspects of
Marine Corps Aviation. [Ref. 74:p. 1-3]
29
Volume I summarizes the "Administrative" aspects of Marine Aviation.
This volume describes the philosophy and the purpose of the Training and
Readiness program as well as the rules and policies governing individual and unit
training. Volumes two through eight deal with each class of aircraft (i.e., fixed-
wing, rotary-wing and tilt-rotor) and Command and Control Personnel (i.e.,
aircraft controllers). The "core skills" are established within these seven volumes.
These core skills are the individual skills that support a unit's Mission Essential
Task List (METL), as prescribed by Marine Corps Manual FMFM 5-1. [Ref.
75:p. 1-3] A METL is essentially a task or mission that a unit's personnel will be
required to perform in combat.
There are four tiers or phases that are measures of the aircrews' ability to
perform their core skills. [Ref. 76:p. 7-3] These phases are:
• Combat Capable Phase - Basic skills acquired at a training unit
before reporting to the tactical unit.
• Combat Ready Phase - Skills and qualifications that are normally
obtained within the first year of assignment to the tactical unit.
• Combat Qualification Phase - Focuses on developing leadership and
supervisory skills.
• Full-Combat Qualification - Qualifies most experienced personnel
for positions of leadership during combat.
To advance, the aircrewman must meet the minimum training requirements
(i.e., flights) established by the Training and Readiness Program. These flights are
described in detail, including brief items, required maneuvers, standards and the
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minimum time required. Each flight is identified by a three digit numeric code
categorized by series (i.e., 100 level, 200 level, up to the 600 level) and valued at a
certain percentage point. Certain higher series codes will update lower series
codes. The percentage points are used to determine the aircrewman's present
combat readiness level. [Ref. 77:pp. 9-4, 9-5] This value is known as the Combat
Readiness Percentage (CRP).
Once an aircrewman successfully completes a flight, the Training and
Readiness code is logged into their logbook and they are considered "proficient"
and "current." Proficiency is the measure of achievement of a specific skill [Ref.
78 :p. B-5]; currency is an additional safety measure based on the exposure
frequency to a particular skill. [Ref. 79:p. B-2] When an aircrewman is proficient
in a specific area, they are qualified to perform that mission outside of the training
environment. To put this in perspective, it is possible to be proficient and not
current but not vice-versa. As a safety feature there are "refly" periods established
in the Training and Readiness program to insure that aircrew remain proficient.
[Ref. 80:p. B-6]
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III. THE FUTURE AND MARINE AVIATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the reader to the Marine Corps' concept for future
operations, Operational Maneuver Warfare From The Sea and one of the key
components to its success, the MV-22 "Osprey."
B. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER WARFARE FROM THE SEA
Operational Maneuver Warfare From The Sea (OMFTS) is the present
vision statement for the Marine Corps upon entering into the 21 st century.
Published in January 1996, this concept has its foundation in and expands on two
Navy and Marine Corps White Papers, ". . .From the Sea: A New Direction for the
Naval Services" [Ref. 81] and "Forward...From The Sea" [Ref. 82]. Both of these
documents defined the strategic concept intended to carry the Department of the
Navy beyond the Cold War and into the next century. [Ref. 83 :p. 32]
This strategic concept recognizes that the collapse of the Soviet Union
significantly decreased the past threat of a large-scale, conventional war between
two "superpowers." To be successful in the future, the United States Military will
have to broaden its large-scale, conventional force-on-force strategy to encompass
smaller, "pop-up" contingency operations. OMFTS is how the Marine Corps
plans to adapt.
OMFTS recognizes that future trouble spots will be concentrated within the
littoral areas. These littoral areas are characterized by large cites, well-populated
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coasts and intersecting trade routes. Though they represent a small portion of the
earth's surface, the littorals provide homes for over three-quarters of the world
population, 80 percent of the "Capital" cities and nearly all the market places of
international trade. [Ref. 84 :p. A-l] Because of this, the Marine Corps envision
themselves as America's premier immediate response force, for these future
trouble spots.
OMFTS combines naval expeditionary, littoral and amphibious warfare in
an effort to best exploit the sea as an avenue of approach. [Ref. 85 :p. A-3]
Extensive use of the sea distinguishes OMFTS from all other types of maneuver
warfare. [Ref. 86 :p. A-3] The sea can be used to gain advantage by allowing the
free movement of friendly forces while simultaneously serving as a barrier to
enemy forces. [Ref. 87 :p. A-3] Using sea-based forces allows the Navy and
Marine Corps to operate independent of requirements for bases, ports, airfields or
over-flight rights from bordering nations. [Ref. 88 :p. A-l]
OMFTS includes three supporting concepts: Ship-To-Objective Maneuver
(STOM), Sustained Operations Ashore and Maritime Prepositioning-Force 2010
and Beyond. The concept relevant to this study is Ship-To-Objective Maneuver
(STOM).
1. Ship-To-Objective Maneuver
Ship-to-objective maneuver employs the concepts of maneuver
warfare to project a combined arms force by air and surface means
against inland objectives. Ship-to-objective maneuver takes
advantage of emerging mobility and command and control systems
to maneuver landing forces in their tactical array from the moment
they depart the ships, replacing the ponderous ship-to-shore
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movement of current amphibious warfare with true amphibious
maneuver...By executing ship-to-objective maneuver, landing forces
will exploit advanced technologies which permit combined arms
maneuver from over-the-horizon attack positions through and across
the water, air and land of littoral battlespace directly to inland
objectives. [Ref. 89:p A-2 A-3]
Historically, amphibious operations have been constrained by the require-
ment to establish a lodgment ashore before proceeding inland towards an objective
(See Figure 3.1). [Ref. 90:p. 8-2] Even after incorporating the helicopter into
amphibious operations some 30 years ago, the "vertical" assault element did not
fully exploit maneuver warfare potential. [Ref. 91:p. 8-2] Basically, the limited
capabilities (i.e., range, payload and quantity) of vertical-lift assets has prevented
full exploitation.
Figure 3.1. Historical Ship-To-Shore-To-Objective Maneuver
[Ref. 92:p. A-3]
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This is now changing, because of emerging technologies such as the
Advance Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and the MV-22 "Osprey."
Increasing capability will allow Naval and Marine Forces to fully exploit the sea
to support maneuver warfare. STOM will become a reality because Naval and
Marine Forces will be able to conduct combined arms penetration and exploitation
operations from over the horizon. Forces will be able to move directly to
objectives ashore without stopping to seize, defend, and build-up beachheads or
landing zones. (See Figure 3.2) [Ref. 93 :p. A-4]
Figure 3.2. Ship-To-Objective Maneuver [Ref. 94: p. A-3]
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2. The Role of Marine Aviation in OMFTS
OMFTS Seeks to extend the boundaries of maneuver warfare by viewing
both land and sea as maneuver space. [Ref. 95 :p. A-6] Marine Aviation adds the
vertical dimension to maneuver, but more importantly it supports the MAGTF
Commander's scheme of maneuver by dramatically expanding his reach
throughout the battlespace. [Ref. 96:p A-6] Critical to STOM and OMFTS
coming to fruition was the acquisition of the MV-22 "Osprey. "
a. The MV-22 "Osprey"
The MV-22 "Osprey" is a tilt-rotor aircraft. Tilt-rotors are a unique
type of aircraft that can operate within both the fixed-wing and rotary-wing flight
envelopes. (See Figure 3.3) The unique design of its rotating engine nacelles and
its "proprotors" are what separate the MV-22 from conventional airplanes,
helicopters and experimental "tilt-wing" aircraft. 5 With the engine nacelles rotated
full forward (i.e., horizontal) (See Figure 3.4), the MV-22 can fly forward as fast
and efficiently as a turboprop airplane. To takeoff, hover and land vertically like a
conventional helicopter (See Figure 3.5), the nacelles are rotated to a vertical
position.
5
Tilt-wing aircraft have engines and their propellers rigidly mounted to the wing. Therefore, to convert
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Figure 3.3. MV-22 Tilt-Rotor Operational Envelope [Ref. 97]
Figure 3.4. MV-22 "Osprey" in Airplane Mode [Ref. 98]
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Figure 3.5. MV-22 "Osprey" in Helicopter Mode [Ref. 99]
The MV-22 "Osprey" was purchased by the Marine Corps to replace
its aging fleet of medium-lift helicopters (i.e., CH-46E "Sea Knight" and CH-53D
"Sea Stallion)". One of the major benefits the MV-22 offers over these helicopters
is its increase in range. This single improvement provides the Marine Corps an
unprecedented capability to project forces from over the horizon to inland
objectives; it is key for implementing Operational Maneuver from the Sea
(OMFTS). [Ref. 100]
The MV-22's superior range relative to the CH-46E and CH-53D
can be attributed to two factors. The first is simply the difference in speed
between a turbo-prop aircraft and a conventional helicopter. As depicted in Figure
3.3, the MV-22 's airspeed in forward flight is about twice the speed of
conventional helicopter.
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The second reason, and most relevant to this study, is the MV-22's
capability to conduct aerial refueling (See Figure 3.6). Marine Corps CH-46E and
the CH-53D were not aerial refueling capable. This limited their range because
these aircraft would be required to land before their fuel supply was exhausted.
Possessing the capability to aerial refuel allows the MV-22 to replenish its fuel
supply in flight and thus fly longer distances.
Figure 3.6. MV-22 "Osprey" Aerial Refueling from a KC-130 [Ref. 101]
A future concept, currently under development by the Boeing
Company could also produce an additional benefit relevant to this study. The
Medium Lift Fuel Dispensing System (MLFDS) is an internally carried refueling
system that will allow the MV-22 to assume a limited "tanker" role. [Ref. 102]
The system is supposed to be installed in a standard MV-22 within 90 minutes.
[Ref. 103] The MLFDS comes equipped with a single hose that would be placed
40
through a hatch located on floor of the MV-22 and trailed behind the aircraft for
aerial refueling operations. (See Figure 3.7) Additionally, this same system could
be used to allow the MV-22 to perform limited Rapid Ground Refueling
operations (RGR). (See Figure 3.8)
Figure 3.7. MV-22 "Osprey" with Proposed MLFDS Aerial Refueling
Configuration [Ref. 104]
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Figure 3.8. MV-22 "Osprey" With Proposed MLFDS Conducting Rapid
Ground Refueling [Ref. 105]
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IV. DEVELOPING A MODEL TO FORECAST AERIAL REFUELING
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MV-22
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes why and how the model for the future MV-22 aerial
refueling training requirements was developed and presents its forecasted results.
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE MODEL
With the delivery of the first production MV-22 during May 1999, a
revolutionary change for the Marine Corps as well as our sister services has come
to fruition. Not only does the MV-22 offer a dramatic increase in speed and range,
but it also expands an important capability to the Marine Corps Medium Lift
Assault Support community: aerial refueling (AR). By expanding the AR option
to our medium lift assets, Commanders will be able to move more Marines further
then they could have in the past. This comprises one of the benefits that the MV-
22's AR capability will offer the Marine Corps, but will there be any problems?
Since the first MV-22 Squadron has yet to go operational, the best method
for answering this question is through modeling. By modeling future MV-22
aerial refueling requirements after a current aircraft, one can quantify the future
requirements into relative terms. Once quantified, an informed evaluation can
determine if this capability presents a problem. If a problem is identified,
preemptive actions should be taken to minimize its future impact.
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C. SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND: A POTENTIAL PROBLEM
The ability to fulfill the MV-22's demand for aerial refueling is one area
where a potential problem could exist. This research issue was previously noted in
Captain David A. Krebs' article, "Aerial Refueling the Tiltrotar-Can It Be Done?"
[Ref.l06:p. XI] To describe this potential problem, Captain Krebs referred to the
economic model of supply and demand. His basic implication was; if the quantity
of aerial refueling tankers (supply) is held constant, and the quantity of the aerial
refueling capable receivers (demand) is increased with the addition of the MV-22s,
there will be a "shortage" in aerial refueling tanker capability. This assumes that
Marine aviation is currently operating at or below an equilibrium point.
Specifically for this study, an equilibrium point would occur only if the Marine
Corps current inventory of KC-130s was capable of meeting the demand for all
aerial refueling tanker support. Therefore, the only situation that would prevent a
shortage would be one where excess capacity exists. Given the present status of
the "aging" KC-130 fleet, this is an unlikely situation. [Ref. 107:p. X2] Thus,
introducing the MV-22's demand will cause a shortage. This shortage will likely
be manifested by reduced training opportunities due to insufficient tanker support.
Regarding who will bear the burden of this problem, one can argue either of
two positions. Either the demanding units' training will be compromised by a
tanker shortage, or the supply units will be compromised by over-working
personnel and equipment as they adopt exhaustive efforts to meet the increasing
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demand for aerial refueling services. A logical assumption here would be the
latter. The KC-130 community will likely bare the majority of burden because of
the "K" in KC-130. This "K" specifies that one of KC-130 community's primary
missions is to provide an indigenous aerial refueling capability for the aviation
portion of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). [Ref. 108:p. X3] Given
the Marines' natural drive for mission accomplishment, it is safe to assume that
the KC-130 community will do everything they can to satisfy this increase in
demand.
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
As stated above, the MV-22's demand for aerial refueling will present a
future problem that will mainly affect the KC-130 community. The task now
focuses on forecasting the increase in aerial refueling demand as the MV-22 is
fielded. Since the first MV-22 squadron has not yet gone operational, some
assumptions must be made to characterize this demand.
The first assumption deals with the aspect of demand on which we should
focus to predict the impact that the MV-22 will have on the KC-130 community.
Occasionally, individuals will cite the increasing number of medium-lift aerial
refueling capable airframes as the determining factor. [Ref. 109:p. XI] For the
purpose of this study, this phrase will only refer to USMC airframes that are
capable of receiving fuel. The error here is focusing on the increase in aerial
refueling capable airframes in the medium lift community, vice the increase to
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total USMC aerial refiieling capable airframes. When one considers all Marine
Corps active and reserve aerial refueling capable airframes, excluding those in
AMARC at Davis Monthan AFB, the increase is about 51%. (Table 4. 1)
But even then this figure does not truly reflect the impact the MV-22 will
have on the KC-130 community. The error in this logic is only estimating the
impact by the increase in aerial refueling capable airframes. Just because one
possesses a capability does not mean that it will be exercised on a daily basis. To
cite an extreme example of this statement, one only needs to look at the usage of
our nuclear arsenal, to accurately quantify the impact the MV-22 will have on the
KC-130 community requires looking at the aerial refueling missions required to
support the MV-22 squadrons.
Table 4.1. Inventory ofUSMC Aircraft Capable of Receiving Aerial
Refueling
USMC AR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
F/WAR Active Reserve FRS Other AMARC Total
capable
AV-8B 131 11 33 5 181
EA-6B 20 20




316 42 52 33 5 469
R/WAR Active Reserve FRS Other AMARC Total
capable
CH-53E 110 18 15 10 9 162
Total AR




Active Reserve FRS Other AMRAC Total
MV-22 235 48 40
. 323
Forecast* *
Vo increase in Marine Corps AR capable aircraft inventory: 51.19%
Based on Marine Corps aircraft distribution as of 30 Jun 99 from Appendix A.
' Based on "Cumulative Operating" numbers from Appendix B.
Quantifying the MV-22 's impact on aerial refueling resources depends on
the demand the MV-22 squadrons will place on the KC-130 community. It seems
likely that their peacetime training demand will exceed any demand during actual
contingency operations. There are several reasons for this presumption. The first
is simply that our training requirements/evolutions far exceed our involvement in
contingencies. The logic here is that every MV-22 squadron will need to train, but
not every MV-22 squadron will be involved in the contingency operation during a
given year. The second reason deals with the 500nm combat radius that the MV-
22 will possess if it is configured with the wing overhead tanks. [Ref. 1 10:p. X4]
Past contingency operations have rarely exercised the aerial refueling
option for assault support aircraft responding to a crisis. The most recent example
(to the author's knowledge) occurred in January 1991 during "Operation Eastern
Exit" in Somalia. Given the same launch point utilized by the CH-53Es, this
mission could have been conducted by a wing overhead tank configured MV-22
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lifted force without aerial refueling. [Ref. Ill :p. X5] This is not to say that
options previously rejected because of limited CH-53E support will not be
exercised after fielding a tilt-rotar capable force. It merely states that, in
conjunction with the focus on the littoral areas in our current doctrine "Operational
Maneuver From The Sea" (OMFTS) [Ref. 1 12:p. X6], deployed MV-22 squadrons
will be able to reach the majority of these future trouble spots without exercising
their aerial refueling capability.
Considering that the MV-22's primary impact on the KC-130 community
stems from peacetime aerial refueling training begs the question: how should we
model the aerial refueling training requirements for MV-22 pilots? The
suggestion analyzed here is to model the MV-22 aerial refueling training require-
ments after that of the CH-53E syllabus (simulator sorties are excluded since they
do not require any external support). This seems to be a valid assumption for
several reasons. First, as illustrated in Table 4.2, both communities have similar
training and readiness (T&R) requirements. The "core skill" flights for a CH-53E
pilot include eight flight categories that require 34 sorties totaling 57.5 flight
hours. [Ref. 1 13:p. X7] The MV-22 syllabus has 1 1 flight categories that require
31 sorties for a total of 55 flight hours. [Ref. 114:p. X8] For aerial refueling
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Table 4.2. MV-22 and CH-53E Core Skills and Sorties Comparison
MV-22 CH-53E
T&R Code Hours Category T&R Code Hours Category
210(S) 2 CAL 210 1.5 FORM
211 2.0 211 2.0
212 2.0 220 1.5 CAL
213(S) 2.0 221 1.5
214 2.0 222 1.5
220(S) 2.0 FORM 223 2.0
221 2.0 320 1.5
222 2.0 321 2
223(S) 2.0 230 1.5 TERF
224 2.0 231 1.5
230(S) 2.0 VLAT 232 1.5
231 1.5 233 2.0
232(S) 2.0 234 2.0
233 1.5 330 1.5
234(S) 2.0 331 2.0
235 1.5 240 1.5 EXT
240(S) 2.0 AG 241 1.5
241 1.5 242 1.5
242(S) 2.0 340 1.5
243 1.5 341 1.5
250(S) 2.0 EXT 342 1.5
251 2.0 343 2.0
260(S) 2.0 DM 350 2.0 DM
330 2.0 360 1.5 AR
331 1.5 361 1.5
270(S) 2.0 TAC 362 1.5
271 2.0 270(S) 1.0 CQ
272(S) 2.0 271 1.0
273 2.0 272 1.0
340(S) 2.0 370 1.5
341 (S) 2.0 371 1.5
342 3.0 372 1.5
343(S) 2.0 280 2.0 TAC
344 3.0 281 2.0
310(S) 2.0 ANSQ 380 2.0



















iotai 54 luu.O 'ib S5S
Simulator (S) 23 45.0 1 1.0
Flight 31 55.0 34 57.5
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sorties, an initial "sign-off for the CH-53E requires 3 flights (each involving a
minimum of three contacts and movements to the refueling position) for a total of
4.5 flight hours. [Ref. 115:p. X7] The MV-22 syllabus requires 2 flights (each
involving a minimum of five contacts and movements to the refueling position) for
a total of 3.0 flight hours. [Ref. 116:p. X8] Once initial proficiency has been
demonstrated, both syllabi require one day and night aerial refueling sortie to be
flown every six months to maintain competency. Fixed-wing, rotary-wing and
tilt-rotor aerial refueling T&R flights are compared in Table 4.3.
Another reason to model the MV-22 's aerial refueling training demand
after the CH-53E vice a fixed-wing aircraft deals with basic fuel legs of each
airframe (excludes ferry flight configuration). Although fuel endurance is profile
specific, for training evolutions both the MV-22 and the CH-53E can fly without
aerial refueling for approximately four flight hours [Ref. 1 17:p. X9], as opposed to
fixed-wing aircraft which average two flight hours or less.
After deciding how to model the MV-22 's demand for aerial refueling
support, the next step is to analyze the relationship between aerial refueling
training requirements for an MV-22 Squadron (VMM) and a CH-53E squadron
(HMH). The important relationship is the number of aerial refueling missions
flown versus the number of pilots within that squadron. This analysis will
quantify the MV-22 squadrons' demand for KC- 130 support. The term that best
50
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Table 4.3. T&R Aerial Refueling Training Flights
51
describes the demand is the number of aerial refueling missions/"frags" flown to
support of the VMM and VMM (Rein) squadrons.
Predicting these missions/"frags" requires assumptions on how the VMMs
will operate. The first assumption addresses the operations departments' strategy
in coordinating KC-130 support. Similarities between the MV-22 and CH-53E
syllabi in maintaining core competencies, imply that the VMM's will at a
minimum strive to maintain proficiency.
The next assumption concerns the VMM's operational schedule. Since the
MV-22 is a medium lift replacement for the CH-46E and CH-53D, the assumption
can be made that the MV-22 will adopt the operational schedule of a CH-46E
Squadron (HMM). This is a valid assumption for the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
(MAW) and 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) since all the Marine Corps CH-53D
helicopters are centrally located at Marine Corps Air Facility (MCAF) Kaneohe
Bay, Hawaii, under the 1 st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Aviation Support
Element (ASE).
If the MV-22 squadrons are going to be equated with a CH-46 squadrons,
then the model must account for any differences between a core HMM squadron
and a composite or HMM (Rein) squadron. To help account for any differences
that could effect either types forecasted demand, a VMM squadron was equated
with a HMH squadron and a VMM (Rein) squadron with that required to support a
HMM (Rein) squadron's CH-53E detachment. The foundation for this assumption
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rests on the basis of similar manning levels. Basically, the two HMHs minus their
detachments had similar manning levels as the sample of core HMMs. Since the
VMM's T/O will mirror that of the core HMM, it can be assumed that their
demand will as well. The VMM (Rein) with a "T/O" of 27 pilots, will have three-
times the number of pilots in the CH-53E detachment. Given these two findings,
any numerical values derived from the HMHs and HMM (Rein) detachments'
demand, could be converted to represent the aerial refueling demand by utilizing a
1:1 ratio for HMH to VMM and a 1:3 ratio for HMM (Rein) to VMM (Rein).
Additionally, using a VMM (Rein) classification would reflect the increased "ops
tempo," regimented training schedule and the predictability in scheduling aerial
refueling training with dedicated KC-130 assets, that are common when a
reinforced squadron becomes part of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
E. LIMITATIONS
Given the criteria established by the previously listed assumptions, there
are two important limitations concerning this model. The first limitation deals
with supporting tanker aircraft. Although the MV-22 will be capable of aerial
refueling from other services' tankers, such as the Air Force KC-135, the model
was developed with the premise that the Marine Corps would be self-sustaining.
For this study, it implies that 2d MAW will fulfill all of MAG-26 and MAG-29
demand for tanker support.
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The second limitation deals with applicability of the model to all four
Marine Aircraft Wings. Since the data gathered to produce the model was
obtained strictly from 2d MAW squadrons, all findings will therefore be expressed
in terms of their impact on 2dMAW.
F. THE MODEL
1. Data
Data for this analysis was gathered from past aerial refueling training
flights conducted by several rotary wing squadrons within 2dMAW. To model the
core VMM squadron, a total of 53 months worth of data was collected from
HMHs-461 and 464. The VMM (Rein) squadrons were characterized using a total
of 39 months worth of data collected from HMMs-263, 264 and 266 when they
were last composite. Statistical analysis of the data gathered from the past flight
schedules, NAVFLIRS and "core reports," was used to derive a numerical value
for the eight model categories.
Before introducing the eight categories utilized by this model, a few terms
should be explained. For the purpose this research, it is important to define "aerial
refueling training mission" and "scheduled." For a flight to be considered an
"aerial refueling training mission," one of three T&R AR codes listed in Tables
4.2 or 4.3 would have to be logged. This implies that at least one KC-130
supported the flight (KC-130s are the only aircraft that aerial refuel a CH-53E).
Flights that occurred on the same day but were separated by less than five-hours
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were considered one aerial refueling mission, unless otherwise annotated on the
flight schedule. For an aerial refueling flight to be considered "scheduled," it
would have to appear as such on the daily flight schedule. Appearing on the daily
flight schedule implies that both the HMM(Rein) and HMH have coordinated this
event with the supporting VMGR (KC-130 Squadron).
2. Model Categories
a. AR Missions Scheduled Per Month
This category accounted for the average number of aerial refueling
training missions scheduled in a month. Since the goal of this number was to
quantify the number of missions scheduled over a time period, months in which no
missions were scheduled were still factored into the calculations. Values were
obtained by utilizing the data listed in Appendix C.
b. AR Missions Flown Per Month
This category accounted for the average number of aerial refueling
training missions flown in a month. Since the goal of this number was to quantify
the number of missions flown over a time period, months that had no missions
flown were still factored into the calculations. Values were obtained by utilizing
the data listed in Appendix C.
c. Percentage ofAR Missions Scheduled that are Flown
This category quantifies the relationship between the number of
aerial refueling training missions flown versus scheduled in a month. The goal of
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this number was to describe the relationship between the two categories regardless
of the time period. Therefore, months that had no aerial refueling missions
scheduled were not factored into the calculation. Values were obtained by
utilizing the data listed in Appendix C.
d. Average Number ofPilots On-hand at Squadron per Month
This category quantifies the average number of pilots that are
attached to the squadron over a time period. Values were obtained by utilizing the
data listed in Appendix C.
e. Average Number ofPilots Per CH-53E
This category quantifies the average number of pilots per aircraft
who logged an aerial refueling T&R code during the flight. Values were obtained
by utilizing the data listed in Appendix C.
/ Average Number ofAR T&R Codes Logged Per CH-53E
This category quantifies the average number of aerial refueling T&R
codes logged per aircraft during an aerial refueling training flight. Values were
obtained by utilizing the data listed in Appendix C.
g. Average Number of Flight Hours Logged Per CH-53E for
AR Training
This category quantifies the average number of flight hours logged
per aircraft in order to complete an aerial refueling training flight. Values were
obtained by utilizing the data listed in Appendix C.
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h. Average Number ofCH-53Es perAR Mission
This category quantifies the average number of aircraft that were
flown during the aerial refueling training flight. Values were obtained by utilizing
the data listed in Appendix C.
3. Results
Utilizing the MV-22 fielding schedule listed in Appendix B and matching it
with the appropriate category of data from Table 4.4 (i.e., HMM (Rein) or HMH),
reveals the number of aerial refueling training missions that will be flown to
support both 2dMAW VMM and VMM (Rein) squadrons. These results were
used to produce Table 4.5. For the KC-130 community, specifically those in
2dMAW, the numbers in the "# AR msn scheduled" and "# AR msn flown" are
the most important. For planning purposes, the "# AR msn scheduled" section
forecasts the scheduled number of AR missions for the KC-130 community.
These are the missions that appear in the monthly "frag" message. The "# AR
msn flown" forecasts the number ofAR missions that the KC-130 community will
actually fly after accounting for cancellations due to weather and/or aircraft
availability. It is important to emphasize that this is the number of missions that
will be scheduled/flown, not flight hours.
Unfortunately, flight hour data was limited to the CH-53Es. However, a
rough estimate based on the "Avg number of hours logged per CH-53E for AR
training" section of Table 4.4 could be established. For planning purposes, a
seemingly reasonable estimate assumes that a KC-130 would fly approximately
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Table 4.4. Analysis Results of Historical Data
AR msns sched per mos 0.79 2.26
AR msns flown per mos 0.72 1.43
% of AR msns sched that are flown
(ignores "0" msn sched mos )
90.91% 60.83%
Avg number ot (UH-53E) pilots on
hand at squadron per mos
9 22
Avg number of pilots per CH-53E
2.92 3.16
Avg number AR T&R codes logged
per Ch-53E
3.25 3.94
Avg number of hours logged per
CH-53E for AR training
2.54 3.11
Avg number of CH-53Es per AR
mission
1.46 1.23
2.5 hours to support a VMM (REIN) aerial refueling training mission and 3.0
hours per VMM aerial refueling training mission. Based on this assumption, and
the AR mission estimates in Table 4.5, about 464 KC-130 flight hours per year are
required to support MV-22 aerial refueling training when their numbers peak in
FY12 for 2dMAW. 6 Of this, about 325.5 KC-130 flight hours per year should be
flown.7
This forecast assumes a hypothetical deployment scheduled based on the
MV-22 squadrons taking over the LF6F deployment schedule by FY-05. [Ref.
1 18:p. X ] The analysis assumes that the last two CH-46E squadrons in 2DMAW
will be removed from the LF6F schedule by FY05 and that they will finally stand-
down in FY09& 10.
6[108x 3.0] + [56x2.5] =464




































































































































































































c © © c
C CD CD C





























•-(mo* o m cd r-- co
Table 4.5. Forecasted Number of Aerial Refueling Missions Required to Support 2d
MAW VMM and VMM (REIN)
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To forecast aerial refueling training requirements, two of the VMM
squadrons were classified as reinforced and all others as core VMMs. This
decision was based on the MEU deployment cycle. In any given year there is at
least one MEU deployed with the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), one
"working-up" for the next deployment and one "standing-down" from the last
deployment. Historical data listed in Appendix C showed that aerial refueling
missions were rarely conducted during that stand-down month. This and the fact
that another VMM (Rein) would not begin "working-up" with the MEU for about
three to four months after their return, implied that the third MEU's squadron
should be classified as a core VMM.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the conclusions and recommendations to the primary
and subsidiary research questions, and suggests areas for further study.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Primary Question
• How many Aerial Refueling training missions should the 2d
Marine Aircraft Wing (MA W) plan to conduct to support MV-22
pilot proficiency requirements?
Table 4.5 depicts the increase in the number of aerial refueling training
missions required when the MV-22 is fielded within the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.
For example, when the MV-22 becomes fully operational within 2d MAW in
FY12, there will be approximately 164 missions scheduled. Accounting for
cancellations due to weather and/or aircraft availability, approximately 117
missions are forecasted to be flown.
Recommendation
For planning future requirements it seems more appropriate to use data on
the missions "flown" vice "scheduled." There are two reasons for this
recommendation. The "flown" data allows planners to consider many of the
external variables (i.e., weather and aircraft availability) that often cancel a
scheduled mission and it implies a more efficient use of assets. By using the
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number of missions "scheduled," planners adopt a myopic strategy. This strategy
fails to recognize other KC-130 commitments. By dedicating assets to fulfill all
the "scheduled" MV-22 aerial refueling, training requirements, other missions may
not be accomplished.
2. Subsidiary questions
• Will there be a difference between the amount ofAerial Refueling
training missions required to support a "core" MV-22 Squadron
(VMM) and a "Reinforced" MV-22 Squadron (VMM (Rein))?
As concluded in Chapter IV (see table 4.5), the number of aerial refueling
missions required by VMM and VMM (Rein) are approximately the same. A
VMM requires approximately 27 missions and a VMM (Rein) 28. However, a
significant difference was discovered between the amount of missions scheduled
and flown.
A VMM will schedule 27 missions in a year, but only fly 16 (60.83%). A
VMM (Rein) VMM will schedule 28 missions in a year, and fly about 25
(90.91%). There is one apparent reason for this difference; the VMM (Rein)
squadron has its own detachment of KC- 1 30s. With to KC-130s in direct support
of one squadron, the VMM (Rein) enjoys a significant scheduling advantage over
the VMM squadron. This advantage is predictability.
Since the two KC-130s are under the MEU's operational control (OPCON)
as part of their ACE, the VMM (Rein) does not have to compete with other units
when requesting KC-130 support. When deployed as part of the ARG, the KC-
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130's will remain in the United States on stand-by. If needed for an actual
operation or training exercise (not routine training), the KC- 130's will depart the
United States and shore-base within range of the operation/exercise. Therefore,
the VMM (Rein) will only schedule aerial refueling training missions when they
know their assets are available. The VMM on other hand has to schedule their
missions and then see ifKC- 130s can support them.
• How can the Marine Corps reduce the impact of the increased
aerial refueling training requirements on the KC-130 community?
To help mitigate this impact, the author offers three recommendations: a
short-term, a mid-term and a long-term response.
a. Recommendation - "Short Term"
For the short-term, it would help to optimize KC-130 aerial refueling
"frags" by coordinating aerial refueling training mission schedules between MAG-
26 and MAG-29. To provide perspective, there were 71 Helicopter Aerial
Refueling (HAR) "frags" dedicated for MAG-26 and MAG-29 squadrons (MEU
squadrons included) from August 1998 to September 1999 (See Appendix D). Of
these, only 5 pairs of missions occurred on the same day. This implies that
roughly 92% of the MAG-26 and MAG-29 HAR missions occurred
independently. This degree of independence is manageable since these "frags"
only support two, eight CH-53E pilot detachments for the composite squadrons
and two core HMH squadrons.
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However, this percentage of independently scheduled "frags" should
become less manageable when MAG-26 and MAG-29 fully field the MV-22.
This degree of independence would reduce the numbers listed in Table 4.5 for
FY12 on, to 152 scheduled yearly aerial refueling training "frags" of which 108
o
would typically be flown. To put this in another perspective, given the status
quo, approximately 304 annual KC-130 flight hours will be required to support 2d
MAW MV-22 aerial refueling training requirements in FY 12.
To suggest that the two HMHs and the six VMMs within 2dMAW
will jointly coordinate their aerial refueling training missions is an example of the
proverbial tail wagging the dog. The approach recommended to reduce the
number independent aerial refueling training missions is blocked tanker times.
Hypothetically speaking, one 5-hour block per month could be
allotted for MAG-26 and MAG-29 helicopter aerial refueling training
requirements, and three 5-hour blocks for 2dMAW tilt-rotor/fixed-wing training
requirements. These blocked times would be predetermined and distributed
proportionately to all 2dMAW Groups to coordinate with their Squadrons. Ideally
this would allow the KC-130 Squadron(s) to determine how best to manage both
the increase in demand associated with the MV-22 squadrons and their own
training requirements.
( 1 64 x .92) = 1 52 scheduled, ( 1 1 7 x .92) = 1 08 flown.
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An important side-note that could make the blocked aerial refueling
time periods even more critical, the MV-22's cockpit might not allow pilots to
"hot-seat" in-flight.
9
[Ref. 119] In Table 3.2, both the HMH and the HMM (Rein)
squadrons averaged approximately 3 pilots per aircraft during aerial refueling
training. A few training flights had upwards of five and six pilots onboard to
better exploit the tanker time available.
If in-flight "hot-seating" were not an option for MV-22 crews, then
the aircraft would have to depart after two pilots fulfilled their training
requirements. The MV-22 would have to land and switch pilot(s) before
additional training could commence. A blocked time period would allow
additional squadrons to conduct training while hot-seat evolutions take place on
the ground. These blocked time periods could also benefit KC-130 pilot training
requirements by increasing the number of tanker rendezvous conducted. They
even may be a necessity when requesting Air Force tanker support.
b. Recommendation - Mid Term
A mid-term approach to reducing the impact of MV-22 aerial
refueling demand would be procuring a variable speed drogue, similar to the one
currently under development for the U.S Air Force's MC-130H. Presently, KC-
130 squadrons operate with two drogues, a high-speed and a low-speed
configuration. The low speed drogue is utilized for helicopter aerial refueling and
9
"hot-seat" - Is a term used to describe the process of replacing one or more pilots in a cockpit with
another.
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has an airspeed range of approximately 105-130 knots. Fixed-wing aerial
refueling is conducted with a high-speed drogue that has a range of approximately
200-250 knots. Presently the approved method for aerial refueling the MV-22
utilizes the high-speed drogue at about 210 knots. Evaluation of MV-22 's low-
speed aerial refueling performance is still on going. [Ref. 120]
Since flying with a "split-drogue" configuration is not a preferred
option, KC-130s are usually equipped with either the high or low speed drogues.
Procuring the variable speed drogue will help reduce the impact of MV-22 by
permitting a KC-130 to perform a seamless transition between helicopter and
fixed-wing/tilt-rotor aerial refueling training missions; this would eliminate the
requirement to reconfigure the KC-130 with the appropriate drogue.
c. Recommendation - Long Term
An effective long-term action to mitigate the MV-22 's aerial
refueling training demand is to procure the Medium Lift Fuel Dispensing System
(MLFDS) discussed in Chapter III. Presuming that MV-22 aerial refueling
proficiency and currency requirements could be updated by tanking one MV-22
off another MV-22, this option would basically allow VMM and VMM (Rein)
squadrons to conduct their own aerial refueling training. This should not
completely abolish the need to aerial refuel from KC-130s, but it is another option
worth obtaining and exercising.
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Two scenarios in which this option would be particularly valuable
include: (1) for a deployed VMM (Rein) squadron's training while their KC-130
detachment is on CONUS stand-by; (2) for the four Hawaii based VMMs, who
will have to rely on transiting KC-130 squadrons/detachments to fulfill their
training requirements.
It is important to emphasize that a tanker configured MV-22 can
deliver about 16,000 lbs. of fuel at a lOOnm radius, and 10,000 lbs. of fuel at a
300-nm radius. [Ref. 121] However, as mentioned in LtCol Timothy C. Hanifen's
July 99 Marine Corps Gazette article, "The MV-22 Osprey, Part III: Warfighting
and Related Acquisition Challenges;" this is by no means a replacement-in-kind
for a KC-130 that can "give" two to three times that amount of fuel over that
range. [Ref 122] What this conversion kit does provide, is an expanded capability
for MAGTF Commanders to exploit in the future.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As a result of this thesis, the author would recommend the following areas
for further research:
• Apply this aerial refueling mission estimation model to the actual deployment
schedule for 2d Marine Aircraft Wing MV-22 squadrons. (Requires
"classified" thesis).
• Develop models for 1st, 3rd and 4th Marine Aircraft Wings.
• Quantify the total number of KC-130 flight hours required in support of MV-
22 aerial refueling training missions.
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••
Assess the impact of the MV-22 Medium Lift Fuel Dispensing System on
reducing the number of KC-130 supported Aerial Refueling training missions.
Assess the reliability of using Air Force tanker assets for MV-22 aerial
refueling training.
Assess the impact that a single "joint" training squadron (VMMT-204) will
have on pilot manning levels as the MV-22 is fielded in the Marine Corps and
Air Force.
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Count of BUNO TMS
UNIT FA-18A FA-18B FA-18C FA-18D Grand Total
MAG-42 DET A 8 8
MAG-46 EL TORO 11 11



















VMFAT-101 5 4 9 23 41
Grand Total 84 4 84 96 268
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'% ofAR msns sched that are flown (ignores "0" msn sched mos)'
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Standard Deviation 1 .320451

































"Avg number ofCH-53E's per AR mission"* 1
.
" Calculated by dividing "Mean" column 2 by "Mean" column 1
.
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HMM (REIN) - Data
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
# Pilots per # T&R codes # of hours


























































HMM (REIN) - Data






















































"% ofAR msns sched that are flown (ignores "0" msn sched mos)"*
* Calculated by dividing HMM-266 "Flown" Data by "Scheduled" Data,
because of data available limitation.
90.91%
"Avg number of(CH-53E) pilots on hand at squadron per mos"**
** HMM (REIN) will always be staffed at a "T/O" of 9













HMM (REIN) - Data
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APPENDIX D. SCHEDULED 2D MAW AERIAL REFUELING MISSIONS
AUG 98 - SEP 99
Helo AR dMA Helo AR Other
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Helo AR dMA Helo AR Other
|HMH-46 |HMH-46 | 22 MEU | 24 MEU | 26 MEU F/W USN | USA | USAF |Tanker Msn
Totals: 25 26 8 3 9 93 11 20 7 150
Total 2dMAW Helo A/R 71
Total 2dMAW FAA/ A/R 93
Total Joint Helo A/R 38
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